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ABSTRACT
This research uses two recently introduced observer rating scales, (Shaw et al.,
2013) for the identification and measurement of negative sentiment (the Scale
for Negativity in Text or SNIT) and insider risk (Scale of Indicators of Risk in
Digital Communication or SIRDC) in communications to test the performance
of psycholinguistic software designed to detect indicators of these risk factors.
The psycholinguistic software program, WarmTouch (WT), previously used
for investigations, appeared to be an effective means for locating
communications scored High or Medium in negative sentiment by the SNIT or
High in insider risk by the SIRDC within a randomly selected sample from the
Enron archive. WT proved less effective in locating emails Low in negative
sentiment on the SNIT and Low in insider risk on the SIRDC. However, WT
performed extremely well in identifying communications from actual insiders
randomly selected from case files and inserted in this email sample. In
addition, it appeared that WT’s measure of perceived Victimization was a
significant supplement to using negative sentiment alone, when it came to
searching for actual insiders. Previous findings ( Shaw et al., 2013) indicate
that this relative weakness in identifying low levels of negative sentiment may
not impair WT’s usefulness for identifying communications containing
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significant indications of insider risk because of the very low base rate and low
severity of insider risk at Low levels of negative sentiment (Shaw et al., 2013).
Although many of the “false positives” acquired in the successful search for
actual insiders in this experiment were shown to be true positives for other
forms of insider risk, WT still produced fairly high rates of false positives that
could burden analysts, as described by the search times provided. As further
research and development proceeds to address this problem, we again
recommend the use of WT in an integrated multi-disciplinary array of detection
methods that will serve as an initial screen to narrow the search for individuals
at-risk for insider activities. The implications for insider threat research,
detection and prevention are discussed.
Keywords: Insider Risk, Digital Communication, Disgruntlement, Detecting,
Negative Sentiment, Threat, Employee Anger, Workplace Violence, Content
Analysis, Automated Psychological assessment, Psycholinguistic software
1. INTRODUCTION
Shaw et al. (2013) have summarized the long-documented association between
employee disgruntlement and counter-productive work behaviors (CWB),
including insider attacks and violations. They also discussed the unexplored
and complicated theoretical relationship between expressed negative sentiment
and insider risk and described the first published empirical data to address such
basic questions as what percentage of organizational emails contain negative
sentiment and what percentage of this content also contains indicators of
insider risk. Using two new observational rating scales of negative sentiment
(the Scale of Negativity in Text or SNIT) and insider risk (Scale of Insider
Risk in Digital Content or the SIRDC) with a random sample of emails from
the Enron Archive, this study found that low levels of negative sentiment were
found in 20% of the sample and that Moderate and High levels of negative
sentiment were extremely rare, occurring in less than 1% of communications.
Less than 4% of the sampled emails displayed indicators of insider risk on the
SIRDC. Emails containing High levels of insider risk comprised less than one
percent of the total sample. Of the emails containing negative sentiment in the
sample, only 16.3% also displayed indicators of insider risk. However, the
odds of a communication containing insider risk increased with the level of
negative sentiment. All of the emails found to contain insider risk indicators
on the SIRDC displayed some level of negative sentiment. The authors
concluded that searching communications for insider risk using mainly
negative sentiment produces an extremely high false positive rate (over 84%)
and that communications with low levels of negative sentiment are particularly
unlikely to yield true positives. They also suggested that research efforts
utilizing email collections without moderate-to-high levels of negative
sentiment are unlikely to be useful due to their lack of inclusion of individuals
with actual insider potential.
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Clearly, communications containing negative sentiment are not rare, but
communications with insider risk variables overlap with these communications
and are extremely rare, complicating efforts to identify at-risk individuals
through their communications. While human coders can reliably distinguish
emails with negative sentiment, with and without insider risk, it is not practical
or desirable from a privacy perspective, to deploy human readers in a search
for these rare communications. While numerous risk detection systems have
been deployed to detect technical behaviors associated with insider risk
(anomalous system use, technical security violations, behavior consistent with
more complex insider risk models (see Shaw and Stock, 2011) there are no
available computerized systems designed to detect negative sentiment and
other insider risk indicators in content beyond key word identification or
document proliferation trackers adapted from legal review systems. Although
a number of automated systems for detecting negative and other sentiment
have appeared on the market, these software packages mainly target very
general consumer, employee and media sentiment, rather than CWB risk in
communications. Among the multiple computer-assisted software programs
designed to identify and measure qualitative content in electronic media, very
few focus on the emotional states and psychological characteristics of
particular individuals, and none do so for the purpose of assessing risk to
others. The overwhelming majority of Qualitative Data Analyzers (QDAs) or
Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) are
primarily designed for commercial concerns, reputation management, and
targeted opinion monitoring. These systems are not equipped with specialized
scales that include individual psychological indicators to detect insider risk.
They do not identify and measure the psychological state of the author or
provide data on other psychological characteristics of individuals linked to
insider risk.
A system that could identify levels of negative sentiment and insider risk of
concern to security, counter-intelligence, and fraud analysts and investigators
could assist them in narrowing their search for suspects in these investigations.
For example, the search for individuals with access, capability and/or technical
or other risk indicators could be further narrowed by identifying disgruntled
subjects within this suspect pool. With input from other multi-disciplinary data
sources (Human Resources, Security, Financial), such a system could also help
identify individuals with greater levels of disgruntlement than their peers, or
increased levels of insider risk factors compared to their previous levels.
The availability of a corporate email sample reliably coded for negative
sentiment and insider risk provided the opportunity to test the ability of
psycholinguistic content analysis software to identify such at-risk
communications. In addition to the system’s ability to screen communications
for signs of risk within this sample, this design also allowed for the insertion of
actual insider emails (and communications from other criterion groups) into the
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corpus to evaluate the system’s sensitivity and false positive rate for these
communications. This section provides a brief overview of the software being
evaluated and its expected limitations, followed by a description of the
research design utilized and the results obtained. The implications for the use
of psycholinguistic software in insider investigations and detection efforts will
then be discussed in light of these findings and the results from the previous
article (Shaw et. al., 2013).
1.1 Background on WarmTouch (WT) Psycholinguistic Software1
WT was previously described in Shaw and Stroz (2004) and was designed as a
tool to help investigators and analysts discover trends in communications
relevant to a subject’s emotional and psychological state, attitudes toward
others, decision-making processes, and communication preferences. While its
variables are derived, in part, from content analysis approaches to leadership
analysis (Hermann, 1980; Shaw, 2003; Weintraub, 1986; Winter, Hermann,
Weintraub, and Walker, 1991), personality, and threat assessment (Shaw,
2006), it has mainly been used to:









Detect signs of disgruntlement and other insider risk factors in online
communications of individuals previously identified as at-risk for
insider problems.
Assess the risk posed by the psychological state and attitudes of
anonymous individuals making threats.
Compare the psycholinguistic patterns of anonymous and known
individuals to help determine the authorship and identity of unknown
persons.
Evaluate the communication preferences and dominant decisionmaking processes of these subjects to aid in case management.
Describe the frequency and valence of communication between parties
for the purpose of understanding relationship patterns and locating
patterns indicative of risk.
Assess the communication preferences and decision-making styles of
parties of interest from their communication in order to understand,
enhance or impact relationships (Shaw and Stroz, 2004).
WT’s deployment in illustrative cases is detailed in Shaw and Stroz
(2004). WT has also been applied to the risk assessment of persons
suspected of terrorist activities within American companies abroad,
analysis, profiling and management of persons engaged in cyber

1

WarmTouch and its use of psycholinguistic algorithms for detecting insider risk is
protected by US Patents 7,058,566; 7,225,122; 7,346,492; 7,395,201; 7,526,426;
7,801,724; 7,881,924; 8,078,453.
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extortion, and insiders participating in espionage, sabotage and
presenting violence risk (O’Brien, 2005; Shaw and Stroz, 2004).
WT utilizes two different psycholinguistic approaches to perform these tasks.
Its variables include psycholinguistic algorithms derived from the academic
content analysis literature and linguistic dictionaries designed to correspond to
specific psychological states or issues. In our experience the combination of
these approaches makes detection of specific psychological states characterized
by general arousal more likely. For example, disgruntled individuals may
express their feelings of anger and victimization through the use of specific
words with psycholinguistic meanings that form our algorithms (negatives as
indicative of anger, the use of the word “me” as indicative of feelings of
victimization). However, in some cases they may also simply threaten an antisocial act without exhibiting a marked change in these variables (e.g., “I will
kill you,” scored as instrumental aggression and a key threat word). It was
therefore important in the development process that WT be able to detect both
types of risk indicators. In addition, our experience indicates that there is some
degree of overlap in the psycholinguistic expression of aroused states (anger,
anxiety, depression), and that while the psychological algorithms used are good
at detecting arousal, the psychological dictionaries are extremely useful for
defining the specific psychological state involved. For example, in our case
experience, angry, depressed and anxious individuals tend to show elevated
levels of self-references (“I” and “me”), direct references to others, negatives,
adverbial intensifiers, and negative feelings compared to controls. However,
dictionary scales designed to differentiate these states are helpful in
distinguishing them from each other. For example, the use of words such as
“sad,” “blue,” and “bummed” versus “worried,” “nervous,” and “agitated” help
us differentiate depression from anxiety.
As noted above, WT uses a number of traditional psycholinguistic content
analysis coding schemes derived from work with written and spoken samples
of leadership and patient verbal behavior described in the WT codebook (Shaw
and Wirth-Beaumont, 2004). However, in the process of applying these
measures to the online communication of general employee populations,
persons in significant psychological distress, and forensic populations, we have
been both supporting and revising the psycholinguistic interpretation of many
of these variables. For example, in his work with patient populations and
leaders, Weintraub (1989) found that the use of the word “me” at relatively
high levels was indicative of passivity. This followed logically from the
overwhelming tendency for “me” to be used as a pronoun denoting the receipt
of action by others. Consistent with this finding, in our cases involving insiders
we have found “me” to be an excellent marker of perceived victimization in the
written and online communications of disgruntled and other forensic subjects.
We will therefore also test the sensitivity of this measure of Victimization to
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disgruntled insiders as a supplement to the less sensitive performance of
negative sentiment alone, described in the earlier article (Shaw et. al., 2013).
Weintraub (1989) also did not subdivide his variable of Evaluators (judgments
regarding positive or negative aspects or characteristics) and Feelings (either
positive or negative expressions of emotions) into negative and positive
categories. In studying individuals at-risk, versus leadership populations, we
have found this subdivision useful.
Because the effectiveness of the WT psychological dictionary of terms will
depend on its ability to capture the way specific subjects experience and
communicate their thoughts and feelings online, they require regular revision
when new subject groups are examined. For example, during a recent
assignment monitoring the communication of employees suspected to be
members of a potentially violent Islamic fundamentalist group, the WT
dictionary was revised to include new terms in previous categories including
depersonalization (“kafir,” “infidel”), dangerous religiousness (“jahiliyya,”
“shahid”), negative evaluators (“against allah,” “crusader”), negative feelings
(“wrathful”), etc. Thus, prior to the deployment of WT in a new setting,
updated vocabulary research is undertaken.
1.2 Use of WT in the identification of individuals at-risk for insider
acts from within an email or other digital communication cache
WT was not originally designed to be used alone to locate individuals at-risk
for insider acts due to their display of disgruntlement or other risk factors in
their communications. Nor would we recommend its lone use for this purpose.
However, we wanted to test the sensitivity and specificity of WT as a screening
tool to help analyst reduce the number of communications to be reviewed in
their efforts to locate potentially at-risk individuals, in combination with other
risk detection approaches, such as signs of technical behavioral anomalies or
variations from baseline compared to a subject’s group or his own behavior
(unusual downloading or copying) or consistency with more advanced models
of insider risk (see summary by Shaw and Stock, 2011). For example, insider
threat analysts utilizing technical risk indicators are often overwhelmed by the
number of “alerts” that might indicate the presence of risk and have difficulty
prioritizing their resources to investigate this feedback. However, a parallel
system that could provide additional information about the likely level of
disgruntlement in an individual could help prioritize these efforts.
1.3 How does WT Work?
When it comes to using WT as a screening tool to search an email or other
communication cache for individuals at-risk for insider or other related
problems, WT presents several options. First, WT can conduct a very broad
search according to a wide variety of psycholinguistic criteria, casting a broad
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net. Or, WT can search a communications cache for a very narrow selection of
emails fitting very specific criteria. For example, in a search for emails
containing negative sentiment, a WT analyst would select a list of
psycholinguistic variables sensitive to negative emotions or beliefs, including
some specialized variables sensitive to particular states applicable to insiders.
Table A1 in the Appendix displays a list of WT search variables that might be
selected for a broad search for negative sentiment, including some of these
specialized categories.
In a search for individuals exhibiting just Disgruntlement (feelings of anger,
victimization, and identification of someone to blame) a WT user might
request a narrower search based on a choice of negatives, negative evaluators,
and references to the term “me.” Second, the WT user might decide he would
like to see those communications with the highest score on insider risk
variables of concern and for this purpose WT produces a list of top scorers in
these categories by email address. In a third approach, the WT user must
decide which segment of the distribution of subject communications displaying
the selected characteristics is of interest. For example, WT will automatically
supply descriptive statistics for the distribution of the variable of interest and
the user may request all emails above the mean in a very broad sweep or just
those emails one standard deviation above the mean—a narrower and extreme
group of communications. Often through a process of trial and error, the user
familiar with the communication culture of their organization will need to
balance the risk of missing true positives by using a narrower search against
the risks of finding numerous false positives by using a broader search. In our
earlier experience with the full Enron Archive, for example, we have found that
a narrow search focusing on emails one-half a standard deviation above the
mean value best balances these concerns. After WT returns all of the emails
fitting the selected variables (and, optionally, ranks these email in order of
concern), the user has several additional options. First, the user may wish to
filter out emails containing the specified variables that are not of interest due to
their content. Newsletters, sports discussions groups, forwarded articles,
advertisements, spam, routine technical reports on system outages, and other
non-germane material that often contains negative content may be filtered by
using key words from the subject line. The user can also filter by date, author,
recipient, or author affiliation as indicated by the email address. We
recommend doing this after WT’s initial installation in order to save analysts
time later. The system will then offer the user several approaches to “drill
down” into the communications discovered, including the ability to examine all
of the email from a particular author by time, recipients, or other WT
characteristics. A particularly useful WT function in investigations is to
examine the email of an identified subject to determine the frequency and
emotional tone of his correspondence with others in his communications
network. This view of an author’s email frequency and tone toward others can
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map a communication network revealing internal conflicts and coalitions that
may play a role in insider investigations.
1.4 WT limitations
Compared to human coders, WT currently has several limitations that may
limit its effectiveness as a screening tool for locating communications
displaying negative sentiment and insider risk. First, the current version of WT
is not able to detect many of the more subtle variables described on the SNIT
that imply, rather than overtly state, negative sentiment. These categories may
include sarcasm, irony, non-negative statements denoting author upset (“there
should be an accounting”) or implying criticism, opposition, or protest
indirectly (“I’ve done my best for the Company”). Second, if a specific
dictionary term is not in one of WT’s vocabulary lists it will not be detected.
Unless one of WT’s non-dictionary algorithms detects an alternative risk
indicator, such words may not be correctly scored. As noted above, it is
therefore critical to update WT vocabulary lists for use with different
populations or groups. Third, the current version of WT has a limited ability to
determine whether the negativity detected is directed toward an individual or
group noted in the content or a less critical topic that does not necessarily
constitute a risk. For example, WT will not be able to determine whether an
author is enraged at his football team’s performance or a coworker mentioned
in the communication. This handicap can be expected to produce “false
positive” results which may or may not be of interest. For example, some
analysts may be interested in such an angry display, no matter whom the target.
Subsequent modifications to WT using more advanced linguistic algorithms
are expected to address this concern.
While we do not expect WT or another computerized system utilizing other
approaches (e.g., Computational Linguistics) to perform as well as human
coders, the initial or full scale review of the content of an email cache by
human coders is not a practical or desirable alternative in most settings. We
therefore sought to determine WT’s relative strengths and weaknesses as an
initial screening tool for this task so that its limitations may be understood by
users.
1.5 Research Questions
As the broad range of WT variables in Table A1 in the Appendix indicates,
there are many ways to use WT as a screening tool to examine an email cache
for indicators of negative sentiment and insider risk. Specific WT variables
may also be better suited for different criterion groups, such as WT variables
for the detection of anger, depression, and anxiety with those respective
cohorts. This part of the research was designed to address the following basic
questions regarding WT’s performance:
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What percentage of emails categorized as High, Medium, or Low on
the SNIT contained in the Enron sample did WT correctly identify?
How many additional emails did WT select in the process of
identifying the above communications that were not identified by the
SNIT (false positives) that an analyst using WT would have to review?
What percentage of the emails categorized as High or Low on the
SIRDC did WT correctly identify in the Enron sample?
How many additional emails did WT select in the process of
identifying these communications that were not identified by the
SIRDC (false positives) that an analyst using WT would have to
review?
What percentage of the actual communications from documented
insiders did WT correctly identify?
How many additional emails did WT select in the process of
identifying the actual insider’s communications that were not from
insiders (false positives) that an analyst using WT would have to
review?
What percentage of these “false positives” identified in the process of
searching for actual insiders would also be of interest or concern to an
analyst or investigator?
To what extent is WT’s scoring correlated with the SNIT and SIRDC
in time series assessments of individual variations in risk with
established perpetrators, and specifically, what is the correlation
between SNIT and SIRDC scores and WT measures for the online
stalker described in Shaw et al. (2013)?
Given the results described in Shaw et al. (2013) indicating that
communications containing insider risk indicators are more likely to be
contained in emails Moderate-to-High in negative sentiment, is WT a
useful instrument for identifying this target group?
Does WT have any feature that can supplement the false positive
problem associated with using negative sentiment alone to detect
insider risk?
2. RESEARCH DESIGN

This assessment of WT was conducted with 1,000 randomly selected Enron
emails described in Shaw et al. (2013). In addition, ten actual insider emails
randomly selected from the principal investigator’s case archive were also
entered into the database, raising the number of emails to 1010. To test WT’s
performance, two different search strategies were used—a broad search
corresponding to a sweep for negative sentiment, and a narrow search
corresponding to a sweep for disgruntlement. The broad search for negative
sentiment was conducted for emails containing any of the WT variables
associated with negative sentiment measured above the group mean. The
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narrower search was conducted for emails reflecting simple disgruntlement that
were one-half a standard deviation above the mean. The selection of one-half a
standard deviation above the mean for this search was a compromise between
the risks of false and true positive results. We did not want to limit the search
by filtering-out all emails one standard deviation above the mean risking the
loss of actual insiders or true positives. On the other hand we did not want to
burden analysts with an excessive number of false positives by simply
reviewing all emails above the mean. We were also informed in our selection
of search criteria by the earlier results in Shaw et al. (2013) indicating that
most insiders and at-risk individuals will be located at High or Medium versus
Low levels of negative sentiment or insider risk factors.
2.1 Broad Search for Negative Sentiment
Table 1 below summarizes WT’s performance compared to the SNIT results.
As the table indicates, WT performed extremely well at locating
communications either High or Medium in negative sentiment as coded by the
SNIT. WT did not perform well at locating emails scored Low on negative
sentiment on the SNIT. WT missed 56% of Low Sentiment emails in its
Negative Sentiment search mode, and 78% of emails scored Low in negative
sentiment in its Disgruntlement search mode. However, we did not expect the
narrow Disgruntlement search to function well in the selection of broader
negative sentiment. As noted above, communications from this Low negative
sentiment group are unlikely to contain seriously disgruntled individuals at-risk
for insider acts. WT also produced a seemingly significant rate of false
positives in both modes, displaying its limited ability to exercise the judgments
attributed to human coders discussed above. Other approaches to these
searches and future testing might improve these results. We also wanted to
gauge the labor burden of filtering false positives on the analyst. Therefore
Table 1 also contains the timed results for these searches.
Table 2 displays WT’s performance compared to human coders utilizing the
SIRDC. As the table indicates, WT did extremely well at locating emails coded
High in Insider Risk. WT performed less well at locating emails Low in Insider
Risk as coded by the SIRDC. In the Negative Sentiment search mode, WT
missed 35% of Low SIRDC emails and 59% in Disgruntled search mode.
However, we did not expect a search for negative sentiment to do well in
locating SIRDC subject communications.
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Table 1 WT accuracy compared to SNIT: 220 of 1010 randomly selected Enron emails
identified as High, Medium or Low in negative sentiment;
WT searches using sweeps for negative sentiment and disgruntlement
% Subjects
Scoring
High, Medium or
Low on SNIT
Identified
By WT by Search
Type
WT Negative
Sentiment Search
Algorithm

WT Disgruntlement
Search Algorithm

High
SNIT
Score
N=6

Medium
SNIT
Score
N= 9

Low
SNIT
Score
N=207

100%
6/6

100%
9/9

43%
89/207

1010 Emails were reduced to
180 emails or 18% of total cache
after search and filtering.
Analyst had to “review” 155
extra emails to locate 15 High or
Medium in Negative Sentiment
and 89 Low in Negative
Sentiment (this review took
approximately 35 minutes).WT
missed 116 emails Low in
Negative Sentiment or 56% of
the Low Negative Sentiment
Group

100%
6/6

100%
9/9

22%
46/207

1010 Emails were reduced to 67
after search and filtering or 7%
of the cache. 6 of these 67
emails or 9% were “false
positives.” Analysts had to
review 6 extra emails to locate
15 in the High or Medium SNIT
group and 46 in the Low SNIT
group (this took approximately 4
minutes). WT missed 78% of the
Low SNIT emails.

False Positives or Emails
identified by WT with no
SNIT Score

Table 3 below displays WT’s performance detecting the emails from the ten
actual insiders inserted into the Enron cache. As Table 3 indicates, WT in
Disgruntlement mode captured all 10 of these insiders. However, we also
examined whether WT’s effectiveness in detecting actual insiders would be
reduced if we used only negative sentiment indicators for the search. As the
second row of Table 3 indicates, the removal of the term “me,” a WT measure
of perceived Victimization that does not represent an overtly negative
sentiment, reduced the effectiveness of the search result by 30%.
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Table 2 WT accuracy compared to SIRDC: 36 of 1010 randomly selected Enron emails
identified as High or Low in insider risk;
WT search using negative sentiment and disgruntlement algorithms
% Emails
Scoring High
or Low on
SIRDC
Identified by
WT Search
Type
Negative
Sentiment
Search
Algorithm

Disgruntlement
Search
Algorithm

High
SIRDC
Score
N=2

Low
SIRDC
Score
N=34

100%
2/2

65%
22/34

1010 Emails reduced to 180 after Search and
Filtering or 18% of cache. 155 of 180 (86%)
were “false positives” so that analyst had to
review 155 extra emails to locate 24/36
containing insider risk. WT missed 12 emails
or 35% of emails Low in Insider Risk

100%
2/2

41%
14/34

1010 Emails filtered to 67 or 7% of Cache. 51
emails or 76% of these were false positives.
Analyst had to search 51 extra emails to locate
16 containing insider risk. WT missed 20 Low
Insider risk emails or 59% of Low SIRDC
emails

WT Results and False Positives and Missed
Communications

Table 3 refers to the false positive rate of WT in quotations because although
analysts would have had to review up to 57 extra emails to locate the ten
insiders, a significant number of these emails would not be considered false
positives by analysts concerned about insider risk. For example, of the 57
emails reviewed to locate the ten insiders, 70% had SNIT scores and 21% had
SIRDC scores. Examples of such “false positives” in the search for true
insiders are displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix, along with their subject
headers, SNIT, and SIRDC scores. Examples of these “false positives” include
content concerning interpersonal and professional disgruntlement, possible
fraud, and injustice attributions. Legal and security staff at several commercial
and government offices where WT is being test bedded have reported that the
damage and labor costs associated with insider activities has been so severe
that the additional labor involved in screening for false positives is well worth
the effort when true positives can be located.
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WT Search Type

Search for Disgruntlement
With Victimization

Search for Disgruntlement
Without Victimization

10 Insider
Emails

WT Results and “False Positives”

10/10 (100%)

1010 Emails reduced to 67 after search
and filtering or less than 7% of cache.
Analyst had to search 57 extra emails
to locate 10 True Positives (which
took approximately 12 minutes).

7/10 (70%)

1010 Emails reduced 112 or 11% of
the cache and then 66 with filtering.
Analysts had to review 59 additional
emails to locate 7 true positives. WT
missed 3 or 30% of true positives
without Victimization.

Table 3 Percentage of true insider emails located by WT by search type

2.2 WT Correlation with SNIT and SIRDC in Time Series
Evaluation of the Online Stalker
Although WT may be relatively less sensitive to Low levels of negative
sentiment and insider risk, we examined whether WT measures correlated with
SNIT and SIRDC results over time across both High and Low levels when
tracking the emotional state and risk of an actual insider. While WT’s relative
insensitivity to Low levels of negative sentiment and insider risk currently
limits its usefulness to detect these groups, WT could still be used to monitor
previously identified subjects at any level if its measures parallel those of the
SNIT and SIRDC.
Figure 1 below displays the original SNIT and SIRDC values for the 17 stalker
emails described in Shaw et al. (2013) with the WT Disgruntlement measure
used in this research for the narrow search. For the purpose of comparison in
this case study, the WT, SNIT, and SIRDC values have been normalized per
100 words to better control for the wide variations in the length of the stalker’s
emails. As Figure 1 portrays, the WT variable of Disgruntlement (composed of
Negative Evaluators, Negatives, and Me) tracked closely with the SNIT and
SIRDC over the 17 emails, peaking just prior to the physical attack and
subsiding afterwards. Disgruntlement was highly correlated with both the
SNIT (r=.867, p<.01, bilateral) and the SIRDC (r=.628, p<.05, bilateral) across
the 17 emails.
It was interesting to note WT’s lack of correlation with the SNIT and SIRDC
on Stalker email number 9, which read simply “Your credibility is gone here.
You should follow.” While human coders easily picked up the negativity in
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these statements, the search version WT variables used for this research did not
include the WT variable Direct References (“you’), which would have scored
both these phrases. However, WT is not yet programmed to detect the
negativity communicated by the negative reference to “credibility” as “gone”
or to “you” and “should leave.” Further analysis is underway to understand the
relative divergence between the WT and SNIT and SIRDC scores. In particular
we hope to explore whether WT’s Disgruntlement algorithm is more sensitive
to some forms of insider risk than the SNIT or SIRDC, whether these
divergences are false positives (WT is scoring terms that do not necessarily
indicate risk), or whether WT is missing true positive indicators as in the
examples above.
60
Physical Attack

50
40
WT Disgruntlement
30

SNIT
SIRDC

20
10
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
SNIT, SIRDC, and WT Disgruntlement scores across 17 Stalker emails leading up to violence

Figure 1 Comparison of Normalized SNIT, SIRDC and WT Disgruntlement Scores
across 17 Stalker Emails

3. CONCLUSIONS
WT appears to be an effective means for locating communications scored High
or Medium in negative sentiment by the SNIT or High in insider risk by the
SIRDC. WT proved less effective in locating emails Low in negative sentiment
on the SNIT and Low in insider risk on the SIRDC. However, WT performed
extremely well in identifying communications from actual insiders randomly
selected from case files. In addition, it appeared that WT’s measure of
perceived Victimization was a significant supplement to using negative
sentiment alone, when it came to identifying actual insiders. Finally, WT’s
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correlation with the SNIT and SIRDC over time in the online stalker case
indicates that its sensitivity to changes in psychological variables is closely
correlated with these human ratings and that it is also sensitive to changes over
time associated with violence risk.
3.1 Implications for Detecting Communications Containing Insider Risk
While we have not yet identified a single target or criterion group for searches
to identify individuals at-risk for insider issues, there has been some progress
in this regard. Based on the preliminary findings from Shaw et al. (2013),
individuals likely to be at-risk for insider actions may present psycholinguistic
characteristics such as High or Medium levels of negative sentiment, as
measured on the SNIT; High levels of insider risk indicators, as measured on
the SIRDC; and some level of perceived victimization or mistreatment. As
noted in Shaw et al. (2013), the frequency of insider risk subsides as negative
sentiment declines.
WT was not designed as a single tool for identifying disgruntled individuals at
risk for insider actions. Rather, it was designed to be used in conjunction with
other tools (such as technical anomaly detection measures) and more complex
models of insider risk, to serve as an initial screen to help narrow a field of
subjects to reduce the false positive rate associated with locating individuals atrisk for insider violations. In this assessment of WT for this purpose, the
system performed extremely well in identifying communications determined
by human coders to be High and Medium in negative sentiment and High in
insider risk factors. It also performed extremely well in identifying
communications from established insiders. However, WT does not appear to be
an effective means to identify and measure the full range of negative
sentiment—it does not perform well compared to human coders at the Low
range of negative sentiment.
However, results from Shaw et al. (2013) and this research indicate that this
relative weakness may not impair WT’s usefulness for identifying
communications containing significant indications of insider risk because of
the very low base rate of insider risk at Low levels of negative sentiment. WT
may not be effective for early identification of persons with Low levels of
negative sentiment that may turn into individuals at-risk for insider activity.
However, the low base rate of 16.3% for communications with negative
sentiment that also contain insider risk and the exclusively low insider risk
scores within this group, indicate that the vast majority of these subjects
present either little or no risk of insider actions. It may be unethical to target
these individuals without statistical evidence that they have such risk factors.
Further time series research will be necessary to determine whether this group
Low in negative sentiment and insider risk ever converts to more concerning
risk levels. Or, whether this low level of negative sentiment is a common
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manifestation of discontent present in many groups. However, WT’s relative
lack of sensitivity to lower levels of negative sentiment and insider risk in
search mode would not limit its use in monitoring previously identified
individuals with higher levels of these risk factors or other sources of concern
regarding risk. This appeared to be true in the case study of the online stalker
presented above, where WT’s measure of disgruntlement followed, and was
correlated with, observer ratings using the SNIT and SIRDC at both high and
low levels of negative sentiment and insider risk.
Although many of the “false positives” acquired in the successful search for
actual insiders in this experiment were shown to be true positives for other
forms of insider risk, WT still produced fairly high rates of false positives that
could burden analysts. We have tried to communicate the extent of this
potential burden by including data on the actual time taken by our users to
filter false positives. As further research and development proceeds to address
this problem, we again recommend the use of WT in an integrated multidisciplinary array of detection methods that will serve as an initial screen to
narrow the search for at-risk individuals using other forms of behavior
associated with this target group.
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APPENDIX
Table 1 Description of WT Psycholinguistic Search Variables
Variable

Variable Description and Examples

Negative Evaluators

Includes negative or pejorative judgment words, not an affect or a
negation; describes characteristics of a person, group, action, or
situation– Stupid; abuse; psycho, bad, poor, loser

Negative Feelings

Affectively negative response or experience–Aggravate; cranky; rage

Negatives

A term that specifically opposes, negates or contradicts– No,
never, words with n’t suffix (won’t) contradict

Adverbial Intensifiers

Adverbs or other modifiers that increase the power of a statement–So,
very, really, too

Anger (algorithm)

A combination of negative terms such as negative evaluators and
feelings along with personal pronouns corrected by content that
modifies or ameliorates the negative statement

Anger (vocabulary)

A list of terms associated with the expression of anger–Hate, angry,
dislike, pissed, irritated

Anxiety (algorithm)

A combination of retractors + qualifiers + neg feelings + explainers

Anxiety (vocabulary)

A list of terms associated with anxiety-Worried, concerned, afraid

Depression
(algorithm)

A combination of I + me + negative feelings + negative evaluators +
adverbial intensifiers

Depressed
(vocabulary)

A list of words associated with depression--Sad, blue, bummed,
depressed, guilty, despondent, crushed, heart-broken

Instrumental
Aggression

Terms referring to weapons or violent means, shows instrumental
intention to harm; distinguished from anger in that anger involves
emotion, rather than intention with method

Victimization

words describing an author’s belief that they have been the subject of
unfair, unjust, biased or otherwise prejudicial or persecutory actions

Trapped

words describing an author’s psychological state in which he or she
believes their options are very narrow and they have little or no choice
but to act

Sexuality

references body parts, sexuality or sexual acts that also tend to reduce
persons to objects

Dehumanization

Includes disparaging remarks, disparaging names or slurs that treat
target as object, inhuman, making attack easier

Disgruntlement
(algorithm)

A combination of negatives for anger, me for victimization and direct
references indicating the possible presence of someone to blame

Disgruntlement
(Long) (algorithm)

Disgruntlement above plus additional variables that capture added
personalization (I), added anger (negative evaluators and feelings)
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Table 2 Examples of “False Positives” in WT Search for True Insiders by Subject Line,
excerpt, SNIT and SIRDC Score
Excerpt

SNIT
Score

SIRDC
Score



I’m so depressed about the whole thing. Rayfael feels
bad too, but it’s important he not be near death
anytime we’re together…He feels like the bad guy.
And I feel like a bad father!!!

54

5.67

Organizational
Announcement

It is with great regret that I announce that Jeff Skilling
is leaving Enron…I regret his decision…our stock
price has suffered substantially…

13

2.0

Demand Kenneth
Lay donate
proceeds from
Enron Stock Sales

…while you netted well over $100 million many of
Enron’s employees were financially devastated when
the company declared bankruptcy and their retirement
plans were wiped out

26

12.33

No subject

Looks like I’ll be rotating out of this job just in time.
Jeff said Louise is just like Shankman. Yikes…We’ve
decided not to tell Binh anything about her. Lavo
stresses her out…

17

1.33

ALSO URGENT
AND
CONFIDENTIAL

Diomedes is going to jump all over me...the
implications are much broader and we don’t want to
come off looking dishonest to our own people. And,
believe me the rumors are out there. I just don’t want
to make it worse…

32

6.67

Re: Directions

Damn’it Jeff. I don’t have time…The panic is my
waste of time trying to get things organized. That’s
the panic…

34.67

0.0

Re: Hey

You must be having a bad day!!!But you know it’s
not my fault…

15.0

0.0

Re: Pacific Virgo

I am concerned about this expert’s conclusions, the
most troubling of which is that our putting the ship on
notice of the end use of the cargo would have been of
so little importance

10.0

2.67

Re: PHC
Statement

I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN SUPPORT PRICE
CAPS… If we could not support them on the
wholesale side, how can we support on the retail side?
Doesn’t it kill the ESP business? WE MUST STICK
WITH THE PRINCIPLES WE FOUGHT FOR ALL
THESE YEARS—SOME THINGS ARE JUST
WORTH FIGHTING FOR…the result of the kneejerk, weekly about-face by the CPUC which cannot
possible be considered to be reasoned…

84

5.0

Subject Line
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